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Accounting Standards in the United
States and the United Kingdom: Their
Nature, Causes and Consequences
George J. Benston*
The purpose of this article is to account for the existence of
differing accounting standards in the United States and the United
Kingdom despite a common language, common practice and a fun-
damentally common political and economic base in the two coun-
tries. What factors explain the fact that, while accounting standards
in the United States are codified and explicit, they remain on the
whole uncodified and implicit in Great Britain? From which system
does the investor more likely benefit? The first section of this paper
begins with descriptions of auditing and reporting standards in each
country. The factors which influence the establishment of account-
ing standards are examined in the following section. Within this
second section, the inherent limitations of accounting
measurements are discussed, from which some hypotheses are de-
veloped explaining the function of accounting standards and speak-
ing to the question of why the standards are stated explicitly or
implicitly. The answers to these questions are then contrasted with
four environmental differences between the United States and the
United Kingdom: (1) the professional environment, (2) the eco-
nomic environment, (3) the regulatory environment and (4) the
legal environment. Finally, the last section presents a cost-benefit
analysis of explicit and implicit accounting standards for investors.
I. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED
KINGDOM
The term "accounting standards," as used herein, denotes the
implicit or explicit rules or conventions which define (1) the allowa-
ble data transformations used in the preparation of the financial
statements, (2) the formats of the statements, and (3) the ex post
facto tests of the statements used by independent accountants (aud-
itors) I in arriving at an opinion. Accounting standards are separated
* Professor, Graduate School of Management, University of Rochester; B.A. Queens
College, 1952; M.B.A. New York University, 1953. Ph.D. University of Chicago, 1963, C.P.A.
North Carolina, 1955.
This paper has benefited considerably from comments and suggestions made by my
colleagues, particularly Professors Jerold Zimmerman and Alice Benston.
1. The designations "accountant" or "auditor" are used interchangeably in this paper
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into financial reporting standards, which include the first two cate-
gories, and auditing standards, which include the third category.
Though accounting standards may refer to the numbers presented
in any financial statement, they generally are assumed to refer pri-
marily to the published statements of publicly owned corporations.
On the whole, the similarities between the accounting
standards of the United States and the United Kingdom outnumber
their differences. Because of this similarity, an accountant from
either country could relocate in the other without feeling too much
out of place and without needing special glossaries to interpret line
descriptions in financial statements. Accounting professors often
hold visiting appointments during which, with little additional
preparation, they can teach both the theoretical and applied aspects
of auditing and accounting (other than income taxation). The bond
between countries is further evidenced by the fact that accounting
periodicals are read and contributed to by practitioners and profes-
sors on both sides of the Atlantic.
The principal difference lies in the way accounting standards
are stated and the extent to which they mandate the presentation
of financial data. These differences are due, I believe, to differences
in the professional, economical, regulatory, and legal structures of
the two countries. As a consequence, the data made available to the
public differ somewhat and the cost of producing and distributing
the data differs somewhat more. But before the factors which influ-
ence the setting of accounting standards are described and ana-
lyzed, the principal differences in the standards themselves should
be outlined.
A. Auditing Standards in the United States
Both auditing standards and rules for reporting financial data
are far more formally stated in the United States than in the United
Kingdom. With respect to auditing, the American Institute of Certi-
fied Public Accountants (AICPA) has drafted and adopted general
and specific auditing standards. These are published as "Codifica-
tion of Auditing Standards and Procedures."'2 Three main categories
of auditing standards are delineated in the "Code": (1) general stan-
dards, (2) standards of field work and (3) standards of reporting.
and stand for the independent certified (U.S.) or chartered (U.K.) public accountant who
certifies or reports on the financial statements primarily of publicly-owned corporations.
2. 1 CCH A.I.C.P.A. PROF. STANDS. §§ 110.01-561.10 (1974). For a brief description of
the development of auditing standards see M. Moonitz, Obtaining Agreement on Standards
in Accounting Profession, STUDMS IN AccOUNTING RESEARCH 4, 4-8 (American Accounting
Association, 1974).
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The first category describes the general qualifications of the auditor
and his need for independence. The second states the necessity for
planning and supervising an audit, the requirement that the client's
internal control system be evaluated, and the requirement that
competent evidentiary matter (including physical verification) and
confirmations be obtained to support the auditor's opinion. The
third category requires assurance that the statements on which an
opinion is given are prepared in accordance with generally accepted
accounting principles applied consistently, and describes thie condi-
tions under which an auditor may and may not give a "clean" or a
"qualified" opinion. In addition, the AICPA has adopted a series of
suggested audit procedures (Industry Study Guides) for specific
industries.
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has, in gen-
eral, allowed the AICPA to develop and codify auditing standards.
As Louis Rappaport observes, "With a few exceptions [reports of
security dealers, investment companies, and the like] the SEC does
not prescribe the procedures to be followed by the independent pub-
lic accountant in his examination for the purpose of certifying finan-
cial statements to be filed with the Commission."'3 The SEC has
used its power, however, to enforce the application of generally ac-
cepted auditing standards and procedures.' The Commission also
has actively supported the AICPA's adoption of observation of
inventory counts and confirmation of significant receivables as
mandatory audit requirements. The most active intervention of the
SEC, though, is in enforcing its definition of independence,5 a defi-
nition that was adopted by the AICPA in 1963.6 This definition
requires CPAs to be scrupulously independent in appearance as well
as in fact: neither they, their families, nor any member of their firms
may have any financial interest in their clients; nor may they give
opinions on statements prepared from records on which they worked
or supervised the original work.
B. Auditing Standards in the United Kingdom
In contrast, British auditors do not work under a code of for-
mally stated auditing standards. Neither the Companies Acts nor
the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales
(ICAEW) dictates specific procedures to be followed in an audit.
Rather, as Bruce Picking states, "While the Companies Acts lay
3. L. RAPPAPORT, SEC ACCOUNTING PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 5-1 (3d ed. 1972).
4. Id. at ch. 5.
5. 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01 (1974).
6. 2 CCH A.I.C.P.A. PROF. STANDS. § 101.01 (1974).
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down requirements with which the auditor must comply, the Eng-
lish Institute [ICAEW] has preferred to rely on persuasion rather
than compulsion in most instances."7 In this regard, the ICAEW has
published a statement, "General Principles of Auditing," which
suggests general standards of auditing and field work procedures
that are similar to those followed in the United States.
The Companies Acts, however, do require limited liability com-
panies to be audited. The Acts specify the auditor's rights and qual-
ifications. In particular, the auditor must be appointed by and re-
port to the shareholders at the general meeting, rather than to the
board of directors or management as is often the case in the United
States. In addition, the auditor has the right to inspect the com-
pany's books and records and be present and be heard at sharehold-
ers' meetings.
An auditor in the United Kingdom must be a member of a
recognized body of accountants and must be independent. Gener-
ally, independence is defined as it is in the United States, with one
notable exception: the British auditor is not precluded from having
a financial interest in the company audited. The ICAEW (and the
other British Institutes) requires only that an auditor be indepen-
dent in fact, not necessarily in appearance as in the United States.
The Institute, moreover, does not have a detailed written code of
conduct as does the AICPA.
C. Reporting Standards in the United States
Agreement on reporting standards or accounting principles in
the United States has been neither as extensive nor as easily
achieved as the codification of auditing standards.' The AICPA es-
tablished a series of committees that issued opinions seeking to
define the "correct" accounting for specific transactions and situa-
tions. The most long-lived of these was the Committee on Account-
ing Procedures (CAP). From 1939 through 1959 it issued 51 Ac-
counting Research Bulletins (ARBs) which recommended rather
7. Picking, Auditing Standards, AccouenNg & BusiNEsS RESEARCH, 13, 60-70 (winter
1973).
8. For an excellent history and analysis of the role of the AICPA and ICAEW in the
development of accounting principles see S. ZEFF, FORGING AcCOuNTING PRINCIPLES IN FIva
CoUNTRIES: A HISTORY AND ANALYSIS OF TRENDS 1-90, 110-236 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
ZEFF]. A good review of the role of the AICPA in the codification of accounting standards is
found in AICPA Study on Establishment of Accounting Principles, ESTABuSHING FINANCIAL
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS (1972) [hereinafter cited as AICPA Study], which also recommended
creation of the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB). The problems experienced
by the AICPA in obtaining agreement on reporting standards are contrasted with their suc-
cess in developing and adopting auditing standards.
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than demanded that particular practices be followed. Consequently,
a number of alternative accounting methods came to be considered
"acceptable." This situation led to criticism of the accounting
profession for allowing companies to report what seemed essentially
similar events in different ways. As a result, the press, analysts and
other critics charged that financial statements lacked comparability
and that investors might be misled.' The AICPA responded to this
criticism in 1959 by replacing the CAP with the Accounting Princi-
ples Board (APB). Unlike its predecessor, the APB commissioned
research projects that were intended to lead to authoritative
pronouncements. Less than half the pronouncements issued, how-
ever, were preceded by research studies. After its first few years, the
APB concentrated on specific, pressing problems which it "solved"
by narrowing the number of permissible procedures.
In spite of these efforts, pressure on the accounting profession
continued to build. An increasing number of lawsuits-with
accompanying news coverage-were filed against CPAs. 0 The ac-
counting practices of conglomerates, other firms that grew by merg-
ers and acquisitions, and land development and real estate compa-
nies were criticized severely. The APB was castigated, as was its
predecessor, for allowing a wide variety of accounting practices to
be called "generally acceptable." The 1972 study commissioned by
the AICPA recommended creation of a new organization, the Finan-
cial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), independent of the
AICPA and sufficiently well funded to employ well paid full-time
directors and staff who would conduct research and promulgate
opinions." These recommendations were accepted, and in 1973 the
APB was scrapped in favor of the FASB. The opinions published
thus far by the FASB continue the trend towards narrowing alterna-
tive acceptable accounting practices.
The move towards uniformity in accounting reporting practices
was furthered by the AICPA's adoption in 1972 of Rule 203 of the
restated Code of Professional Ethics. 2 The rule requires that "[a]
member shall not express an opinion that financial statements are
presented in conformity with generally accepted accounting princi-
ples if such statements contain any departure from an accounting
principle promulgated by the body designated by the Council to
9. See, e.g., L. RAPPAPORT, supra note 3, at 3-1 to 3-9. See generally A. BRILonF, UNAC-
couNrABLE AccoUTING (1972).
10. See Gormley, Accountants' Professional Liability-A Ten-Year Review, 29 Bus.
LAW. 1205, 1223 (1974); Marinelli, The Expanding Scope of Accountants' Liability to Third
Parties, 23 CASE W. Rs. L. Rav. 113 & n.2 (1971).
11. See AICPA Study, supra note 8, at 70 (creation of FASB recommended).
12. 2 CCH A.I.C.P.A. PROF. STANDS. § 201.01 (1974).
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establish such principles which has a material effect on the state-
ments taken as a whole . . . . -3 An exception is allowed if the
member believes that the statements would otherwise be mislead-
ing, in which event the departure and its effects must be disclosed,"
but the onus is on the accountant to justify a deviation from the
"principles" if it has a material impact on the financial statements.
Perhaps the most important force in moving United States ac-
counting standards toward greater uniformity is the SEC. Sections
19(a) of the Securities Act of 193315 and 13(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 193411 give the SEC the power to prescribe
. ..the items or details to be shown in the balance sheet and the earnings
statement, and the methods to be followed in the preparation of reports, in the
appraisal or valuation of assets and liabilities, in the determination of depre-
ciation and depletion, in the differentiation of recurring and nonrecurring
income, in the differentiation of investment and operating income, and in the
preparation, where the Commission deems it necessary or desirable, of sepa-
rate and/or consolidated balance sheets or income accounts .... ,
Rather than use this power, the Commission has chosen to accept
the practices deemed generally acceptable by the accounting profes-
sion. The realization that the SEC could prescribe accounting pro-
cedures, however, has spurred the AICPA towards formalization of
"generally accepted accounting principles.""8
That the SEC has neither used its power to reshape accounting
into whatever image it thought best nor even conducted, or spon-
sored much research on the question does not mean that it has been
passive. The SEC's Regulation S-X'5 prescribes the specific items
which must be disclosed in the financial statements filed with the
Commission. The list of accounts is long in comparison to the stan-
dards of reporting in the United States before enactment of the
Securities Act and in comparison with reporting in other countries."
For the balance sheet, Regulation S-X calls for more than sixty-five
specific items compared to thirty-nine required in the United King-
dom by the Companies Act and The Stock Exchange.2 .' For the
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a) (1970).
16. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b) (1970).
17. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b) (1970). The wording
of the 1933 Act is substantially similar. 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a) (1970).
18. The SEC's role in establishing accounting principles is described in RAPPAPORT,
supra note 3, at ch. 2-4.
19. 17 C.F.R. § 210 (1974).
20. See Benston, Corporate Financial Disclosure in the U.K. and the U.S.: A Compari-
son and Analysis, INswrr. OF CHARTERED Acc'TANTs IN ENGLAND AND WALES ch. 3 (1975).
20.1. These counts are very inexact since the separate listing of required items was
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income statement, the SEC requires about fifty-three items com-
pared to thirty-seven required in Great Britain. Regulation S-X and
the instructions to the forms also specify rules for consolidating
statements of a company and its subsidiaries, disclosing contingent
liabilities, and, among other practices, reporting extraordinary in-
come and expense. In addition, the SEC requires that registered
companies prepare a statement of changes in financial condition
(source and application of funds), quarterly statements and
monthly reports."'
The Commission also has been a powerful force in maintaining
the traditional conservative bias in accounting data. The historical
basis of recording assets is the only method allowed, with very few
exceptions. In particular, the SEC has neither permitted assets to
be revalued td their replacement or market values nor permitted
general price level adjusted statements. Even before APB Opinion
No. 17 was issued in 1970,2 requiring companies to write off goodwill
and other intangibles over the lesser of the period benefited or forty
years, the SEC generally insisted on relatively rapid write-off of
intangibles.? Until recently, prospectuses could not include "soft"
information, such as appraisals of assets and forecasts of sales or
earnings. Nevertheless, pursuant to a statement of policy in a yet
unadopted 1972 Release,2 the SEC has allowed the use of soft infor-
mation under certain limited circumstances.
It might seem that the SEC's influence on the contents of finan-
cial statements is limited to the forms filed with it. The Commis-
sion's proxy regulations,25 however, require that companies send fin-
ancial ("information") statements to shareholders with respect to
meetings, whether or not proxies are solicited. Rule 14a-3,2 adopted
in 1967, requires a company to note and explain any material differ-
ences between the statements presented to shareholders and those
filed with the SEC. Thus, though the SEC does not specify the form
or contents of the financial reports made by management to their
shareholders, Rule 14a-3 effectively makes Regulation S-X and the
SEC's other pronouncements the determinants of published finan-
made for purposes of reference rather than for the present purpose. The count of the number
of items listed in Regulation S-X also considerably understates the complexity of the Regula-
tions.
21. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13a-1, .13a-11, .13a-13, 249.310, .312 (1974).
22. A.P.B. Opinion No. 17, Intangible Assets (Aug. 1970).
23. See L. RAPPAPORT, supra note 3, at 3.34-.37.
24. Securities Act Release No. 5362, [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. §
79,211 (Feb. 2, 1973).
25. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a (1965); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14c (1966).
26. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3 (1967).
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cial statements for all registered corporations (generally, intrastate
owned corporations and those with one million dollars or less assets
and 500 or fewer holders of a class of equity securities).
D. Reporting Standards in the United Kingdom
As is the case with auditing standards, British reporting stan-
dards, as governed by the Companies Acts of 194827 and 196728 are
not nearly as formalized as they are in the United States. All limited
liability companies, whether widely held or not, must prepare and
present annual, audited balance sheets and income statements to
security holders and to the Department of Trade and Industry
(DTI). 29 In 1971, 527,643 companies not in liquidation were regis-
tered with the DTI. Of these only 15,452 were public companies"
and only about a third of these were listed on The Stock Exchange.
There is no over-the-counter market, as we know it, in the United
Kingdom. The contents of prospectuses are prescribed by the Com-
panies Act of 1948, Fourth Schedule.3 1 As in the United States, a
prospectus is required when securities are offered to the public, but
this almost always occurs in conjunction with obtaining a Stock
Exchange listing. Prospectuses need not be prepared for rights and
secondary offerings, as is required in the United States since a pros-
pectus is not required for securities that are substantially the same
as securities of the same company that already are listed.. Further-
more, the Companies Acts' definition of a security is much less
expansive than is the SEC's definition.3 2 Hence, though many more
27. Companies Act 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38 (1972).
28. Companies Act 1967, 2, c. 81 (1972).
29. Companies Act 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 124-29 (1972).
30. 1971 Department of Trade and Industry Annual Report. A private company is one
that limits its members to 50 and prohibits any invitation to the public to subscribe for any
shares or debentures in the company. Companies Act 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, §§ 124-29
(1972).
31. Companies Act 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, sched. 4 (1972).
32. The Companies Act 1948, Part II, "Share Capital and Debentures" does not explic-
itly define "share capital" or "debentures." Section 455 defines "debenture" to include "de-
benture stock, bonds and any other securities of a company whether constituting a charge
on the assets of a company or not," and "share" to mean "share in the share capital of a
company, and includes stock except where a distinction between stock and shares is expressed
or implied." The Securities Act of 1933, § 2(1) defines a security as "any note, stock, treasury
stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in
any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or sub-
scription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of de-
posit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, or, in
general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a 'security,' or any certificate of
interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or
warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing."
In addition, rulings and case law have extended the definition considerably.
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United Kingdom than United States companies are subject to an-
nual reporting requirements, many fewer are required to prepare
prospectuses.
Administration of the Acts is the responsibility of the DTI. It
has the power to initiate investigations, appoint inspectors, bring
proceedings in the name and on behalf of shareholders and require
corporate officers to produce books, documents and themselves as
requested by the inspectors. The Acts also give the DTI (and the
Director of Public Prosecutions and Lord Advocate) the power to
make summary judgments on all matters punishable by fines.
Although the DTI has the power to "alter or add to the require-
ments of this Act as to matters to be stated in a company's balance
sheet, profit and loss account and group accounts"33 and to adapt
requirements to the circumstances of individual companies, the
quoted section continues: "No regulation shall be made under sub-
section (1) of the section so as to render more onerous the require-
ments therein referred to. . . ."I' Thus the DTI cannot and does not
promulgate regulations and rules as does the SEC. Nor does it either
examine the reports filed with it or even verify that all limited
companies have filed reports as required by law. Rather, as the
Jenkins Committee reported with approval: ". . . except where
fraud or misfeasance is in question and damage has been caused,
they do not ordinarily proceed to prosecution unless requests to the
company to comply with the Act have been made and failed."35
Essentially, then, the DTI is much more a repository for documents
than a regulatory agency.
The Companies Acts require companies to report specific items,
such as particulars about share capital, reserves, the distinction
between fixed and current assets, the amount of investments by
type, goodwill, outstanding loans, sales, depreciation, interest,
charitable and political contributions, directors' emoluments, and
salaries of principal officers. The accounting requirements of the
Acts are not limited, however, to the specifically mentioned items.
Rather, the Companies Acts require that companies keep " . . .
such books as are necessary to give a true and fair view of the state
of the company's affairs and to explain its transactions."3
Since almost all publicly held companies are listed on The
Stock Exchange, the Exchange's reporting requirements supple-
ment those given by the Companies Acts. In general, The Stock
33. Companies Act 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c.38, § 454(1), at 696 (1972).
34. Id. § 454(3), at 696.
35. Report of the Company Law Committee, CMD. No. 1749, § 505 (1962).
36. Companies Act 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c.38, § 147(2), at 523 (1972).
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Exchange's rules exceed those of the Acts by requiring semi-annual
statements, more detail with respect to prospectuses, and approval
of the prospectuses by the Quotations Department before securities
are marketed. In this regard, the Quotations Department operates
much as does the SEC. The Stock Exchange defers completely to
the ICAEW and the other Institutes of Chartered Accountants with
respect to accounting "principles." In June, 1972, The Stock Ex-
change adopted the following provision: "The Council support the
accountancy bodies in the formulation of their Accounting Stan-
dards, and expect reports to be prepared in conformity with those
standards. Any significant departure therefrom must be disclosed
and explained. 3 7 While this statement is similar to the SEC's Ac-
counting Series Releases 4 and 150, The Stock Exchange does not
promulgate detailed regulations such as Regulation S-X or issue
opinions on accounting standards such as the Accounting Series
Releases.
Thus, given the specific reporting requirements of the Compa-
nies Acts and The Stock Exchange's listing agreement, the Insti-
tutes of Chartered Accountants (England and Wales, Scotland and
Ireland) are completely responsible for the promulgation of account-
ing standards. Since all public accountants must be members of one
of the recognized accounting bodies to practice their profession, the
bodies are, in principle, very powerful. Nevertheless, the United
Kingdom Institutes have not been nearly as active in rule making
as have their counterparts in the United States. Before the Taxation
and Financial Research Committee of the ICAEW was founded in
1942, pronouncements on accounting and auditing concepts and
procedures were not made.38 Between 1942 and 1953 the Council of
the ICAEW approved fifteen "Recommendations on Accounting
Principles." These Recommendations, which were not binding on
the members of the Institute, dealt with such subjects as income tax
charges, disclosure of reserves, consolidated accounts, the content
of balance sheets and income and expense statements, depreciation,
valuation of stock-in-trade, accounting for changing price levels and
accounting reports for prospectuses. From 1953 through 1969, four-
teen additional Recommendations were issued, four of which re-
placed earlier Recommendations. Topics covered included two on
which the Council of the English Institute disagreed with the posi-
tion taken by the Research and Publications Committee of the Insti-
tute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland-accounting for invest-
37. The Stock Exchange Rules, c.3, 6, at 49 (1974).
38. ZmFF, supra note 8, contains an extended discussion of the development of account-
ing principles and standards in the U.K.
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ment grants and the treatment of unrealized capital gains by invest-
ment trusts.
The "Recommendations" were, as their title indicates, recom-
mendations rather than obligatory rules. As the usual introductory
paragraph to the Recommendations states:
Whilst it is recognized that the form in which accounts are submitted to
shareholders is [subject to compliance with the Companies Act] a matter
within the discretion of directors, it is hoped that the Recommendations will
be helpful to members in advising, in appropriate cases, as to what is regarded
as the best practice.a"
The ICAEW's approach to pronouncements on accounting
practices changed in 1969. Partly because of several highly publi-
cized events that led financial journalists to "wonder" how different
accountants could report different profit amounts for what appeared
to be the same transaction, and partly because it was already mov-
ing in that direction, in 1970, the ICAEW in association with the
other accountancy bodies formed an Accounting Standards Steering
Committee (ASSC).
In contrast to the introduction to the Recommendations, the
"explanatory foreword" to the Statements of Standard Accounting
Practice prepared by the ASSC and issued by the ICAEW states:
The Council expects members of the Institute who assume responsibilities
in respect of financial accounts to observe accounting standards.
Where this responsibility is evidenced by the association of their names
with such accounts in the capacity of directors or other officers the onus will
be on them to ensure that the existence and purpose of standards are fully
understood by non-member directors and other officers, and to use their best
endeavours to ensure that standards are observed or, if they are not observed,
that significant departures from them are disclosed and explained in the ac-
counts and their effect, if material, disclosed.
Where members act as auditors or reporting accountants the onus will be
on them not only to ensure disclosure of significant departures but also, to the
extent that their concurrence is stated or implied, to justify them.
The Council, through its Professional Standards Committee, may inquire
into apparent failure by members of the Institute to observe accounting stan-
dards or to disclose departures therefrom."0
The next three paragraphs begin, however, by stating: "Ac-
counting standards are not intended to be a comprehensive code of
rigid rules,"4 and conclude with the general principle: "In judging
exceptional or borderline cases it will be important to have regard
to the spirit of accounting standards as well as to their precise
39. Recommendations on Accounting Principles, Council of the ICAEW.
40. ICAEW, STATEMENTS OF STANDARD ACCOUNTING PRACTICE 3-6, at 1 (rev. 1973).
41. Id. 8, at 2.
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terms, and to bear in mind the overriding requirement to give a true
and fair view."4
Through November 1974 the ICAEW has issued thirteen Expo-
sure Drafts which cover such topics as accounting for mergers and
acquisitions, extraordinary items, stocks and work in progress, value
added tax, deferred taxation, and inflation, and the contents of a
required funds statement. Two discussion papers-inflation and
accounts, and corporation tax under the imputation system-were
released. Three of the thirteen Exposure Drafts were converted into
Statements of Standard Accounting Practice: "Accounting for the
Results of Associated Companies," "Disclosure of Accounting Poli-
cies," and "Earnings per Share," the last statement issued in Feb-
ruary, 1972. In May 1974, three additional Statements of Standard
Accounting Practice were recommended by the ASSC for approval
by the Councils of the accounting bodies: "The Accounting Treat-
ment of Government Grants," "Accounting for VAT," and "Ex-
traordinary Items and Prior Year Adjustments." 3
Thus it would seem that British accountants are moving closer
to their American counterparts in specifying accounting standards
which all companies must follow. British rules essentially maintain,
however, that each accountant should rely on his professional judg-
ment and integrity to determine whether a company's accounts
present a "true and fair view" and are prepared in conformity with
the Companies Acts.
II. FACTORS WHICH INFLUENCE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ACCOUNTING
STANDARDS
A. The Function of Accounting Standards-Some Hypotheses
Were it possible for the accounting numbers reported in finan-
cial statements to be unambiguous measures of wealth (balance
sheets) and changes in wealth (income statements), a major func-
tion of reporting standards would be obviated. Unfortunately, such
measurements require knowledge of the present values of future
cash flows or current market values of assets and liabilities. This
information rarely is objectively known. Future cash flows are diffi-
cult to estimate with a satisfactory degree of certainty, nor can
anyone be sure of the rate at which these flows should be discounted
to determine present values. Current market values do not exist for
very many assets and liabilities, nor is there much certainty that the
42. Id. 10.
43. ICAEW, STATEMENTS OF STANDARD ACcOUNTING PRACTICE (rev. 1974).
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values estimated will prevail should exchanges actually be made.
Consequently the economic value of an enterprise and of its individ-
ual assets and liabilities can be determined only by subjective esti-
mates of cash flows, discount rates and market values.
The accounting numbers that are reported, then, are the result
of imperfect measurements of economic transactions. These trans-
actions are stated in monetary units which are aggregated into
classes. This process necessarily involves the application of exper-
tise and judgment. Auditing expertise is required to determine that
the monetary units recorded on a company's records reflect physical
units (such as inventory, claims to assets-e.g., receivables, fixed
assets) owned, debts owed, and changes therein over time. Judg-
ment is required to determine how much of an asset is depreciated
during a given time period, what monetary value should be assigned
to an asset received in an asset exchange in which neither asset has
an objectively determined market value, and what amount should
be assigned as the cost of goods sold when the inventory was pur-
chased at different prices.
In spite of these imperfections, were the readers of financial
statements intimately familiar with the economic events that im-
pinge on a company and fully cognizant of the limitations of ac-
counting measurements thereof, there would be little need for ac-
counting standards. These readers could determine how well the
financial statements reported the entity's wealth and its changes.
They could adjust the reported numbers for the biases and limita-
tions of the accounting numbers or disregard the numbers if they
gave misleading or meaningless signals. Unfortunately, many read-
ers of financial statements do not have the required knowledge to
determine how well financial statements report economic events.
Nor can they obtain the information they want from other sources.
Therefore, they must rely, partially, on the expertise and judgment
of others, including analysts. A company's managers, who are inti-
mately familiar with the company and its environment, are well
equipped to prepare the financial statements. Since an important
function of financial statements is to report on the manner in which
the managers have used the resources entrusted to them, however,
it obviously would be unwise for shareholders and creditors simply
to accept the managers' report. While the managers' judgments
might be as accurate as can be expected, the accounting reporting
process is inherently subject to manipulation by those managers so
inclined.
Consequently, for many centuries non-management owners
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have engaged independent, expert accountants to audit the records
of the managers and give their opinions about the financial state-
ment prepared by the stewards. The owners then can rely on the
judgment and ability of the independent accountants to verify that
the managers' reports were not deliberately manipulated to hide
major defalcations or inept use of resources. When ownership of
enterprises became so widespread that the owners could not person-
ally judge the honesty and ability of independent accountants, it
became desirable to certify these experts as meeting some minimum
level of integrity and ability. Thus the states (in the United States)
or professional societies (in the United Kingdom) established the
designation, certified or chartered public accountant, to identify
these experts to the public. It obviously harms members of this
designated group of experts when one of their number fails to meet
the level of independence and expertise expected by the public. The
establishment and maintenance of a minimum standard of perform-
ance has value to the group, therefore, beyond the service such a
standard may provide for limiting entry into and competition within
the profession. This rationale explains, I believe, the existence of
auditing and independence standards, whether explicit or not.
Reporting standards are designed also to protect the profession,
particularly against the charge that an individual is not indepen-
dent or expert when, in the light of later events, the financial reports
appear to be inaccurate or misleading. As is discussed above, ac-
counting numbers are inherently imperfect measures of economic
events. What may have been a perfectly reasonable reporting deci-
sion subsequently may appear suspiciously fraudulent. An example
would be the treatment of an exchange of property for a long term
note receivable as a sale where ultimately the note cannot be col-
lected. Therefore, the profession may seek to protect the reputations
of its members by establishing standards that govern the reporting
of events.
Accountants are not the only group who find accounting stan-
dards desirable. As is discussed above, owners also may find audit-
ing standards an efficient means of assuring that the auditors fol-
lowed the minimum professionally established procedures. This as-
surance is particularly desirable when auditors are engaged by man-
agement. An honest and competent management also might want
to assure owners that the reports prepared have, indeed, been inde-
pendently and competently verified. Finally, government regulators
may find accounting standards very useful. When these officials are
charged with overseeing the disclosure of financial data, they are
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perhaps more concerned than are accountants that the data appear
"correct" or, at least, not misleading or fraudulent. Unlike accoun-
tants, regulators do not work with (and are not compensated by)
clients who want to communicate the economic "facts" of their
enterprise to shareholders and prospective investors. Rather the reg-
ulators must absorb the cost of public and industry criticism and
risk loss of legislative support if they permit publication of financial
statements that disgruntled investors charge are misleading or
fraudulent as a consequence of errors of judgment or inadequate
audits by accountants. Regulators, therefore, are interested in hav-
ing accounting standards against which to evaluate the financial
statements presented to the public.
B. The Standards-Explicit or Implicit?
The following discussion examines the factors that appear to
determine whether auditing and reporting standards are explicit or
implicit, rigid or flexible. Differences in the professional, economic,
regulatory and legal environments in the United States and the
United Kingdom provide a means for testing hypotheses on the
strength and effect of the factors mentioned. In general, I believe
public accountants would prefer that accounting standards were
implicit rather than explicit. The more explicit the standards, the
less freedom accountants have to exercise their professional skills
and judgment, and hence their esteem and the economic value of
their services are commensurately diminished. Given this underly-
ing preference, one may hypothesize that accounting standards
would be more explicit with less effective peer pressure within the
professional environment, wider ownership of shares by individuals,
greater governmental regulation and greater legal liability of ac-
countants.
1. The Professional Environment in the U.S. and the UK.
The United States and the United Kingdom differ with respect
to the professional organization of accountants in several important
respects. First, American certified public accountants are licensed
by the states. Each state determines the educational experience and
personal qualifications required of candidates. While the required
examination is generally the same in each state and is graded cen-
trally, the states individually determine when candidates may sit
for all or part of the examination, and the state authorities may
assign final passing or failing grades to marginal papers. Each state
also determines the conditions under which a CPA licensed in an-
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other state may move his practice. Perhaps most important with
respect to peer pressure, only the states may revoke a CPA's license
or otherwise discipline him for inept practices, lack of integrity,
breach of fiduciary responsibility, or other conduct that tends to
bring dishonor on the profession to the detriment of other CPAs.
CPAs need not join the AICPA and as a result about a third are not
members. Hence, the non-members are not subject to the AICPA's
Code of. Professional Ethics, nor are CPAs subject to the SEC's
disciplinary authority if they do not audit the records of a client who
is subject to the Securities Acts.
Chartered accountants in the United Kingdom must be admit-
ted to membership in one of the six recognized accountancy bodies
(the largest being the ICAEW). In addition, members are subject to
the rules of the bodies even if they are not engaged in the practice
of public accounting, so long as they wish to be known as chartered
accountants. Thus, when the ICAEW states that "The Council ex-
pects members of the Institute who assume responsibilities in re-
spect of financial accounts to observe accounting standards,"4 it is
exercising its authority over company directors and comptrollers as
well as independent auditors. Because the power of the accountancy
bodies over chartered accountants is so great, presumably they must
exercise care and restraint in promulgating explicit accounting and
auditing standards. In effect, their Statements of Standard Ac-
counting Practice are the law for the accounts of all limited liability
companies.4 5
In addition, the accounting profession itself is more compact in
the United Kingdom than in the United States. The relatively small
size and the concentrated geographical distribution of the major
British accounting bodies' membership (England and Wales, Scot-
land, and Ireland) tend to bring a chartered accountant who is
incompetent or who lacks integrity to the attention of his colleagues.
In the United States, the AICPA has a nationwide membership and
the state societies have little power over individual CPAs who may
only hold membership in the AICPA (if that). As a consequence,
peer pressure is a more potent force in the United Kingdom than in
the United States.
Finally, the British issuing houses follow a practice with respect
to prospectuses that assures the existence of minimum accounting
standards for the statements of publicly owned companies. If a
small or medium sized firm of chartered accountants has audited
44. See note 40, supra, and accompanying text.
45. See text accompanying note 66 infra.
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the books of a company that applies for listing on The Stock Ex-
change, the issuing house or broker who handles the issue usually
insists that a well-known firm of chartered accountants be ap-
pointed additionally as reporting accountants. Reporting accoun-
tants also may be appointed even when a large firm is the com-
pany's auditor. This practice thus provides a potential peer review
by the "better" firms of the auditing and reporting practices of
accountants who audit the records of companies going public.
In summary, the professional environment in the United King-
dom leads to considerably greater peer control over auditing and
reporting practices than is the case in the United States. Hence, the
need for explicit accounting standards is greater in the United
States than in the United Kingdom. As the descriptive material
presented in section I indicates, the British chartered accountants
have no explicitly stated auditing standards and few explicitly
stated reporting standards.
2. The Economic Environment in the United States and the
United Kingdom
The nature of the demand by persons for information about
individual corporations is the principal relevant difference in the
economic environment between the two countries. In general, Amer-
ican corporations are owned by more individual investors who
directly trade their securities than are British corporations. Further,
American investors appear more interested in using or at least in
reviewing financial statements for investment decisions than are
investors in the United Kingdom. This demand by numerous indi-
viduals for financial information determines, in part, the way infor-
mation is supplied by corporations.
Though reliable data on the number of persons who own shares
is not available, in part because shares often are reported in a bro-
ker's street name, it seems clear that both in absolute and relative
terms the number of individuals owning and trading corporate
shares is greater in the United States than in the United Kingdom.
With respect to stockholders, at year end 1969 some 68.4 percent of
American corporate stock outstanding was held by individuals"
(and some minor institutional investors) compared to 47.4 percent
held by individuals, executors and trustees in the United
Kingdom." Since American corporations, in general, are larger than
46. 38 SEC ANN. REP. 151 (1972).
47. J. MOYLE, THE PATrERN OF ORDINARY SHARE OWNEMRSIP, 1957-1970, at 11 (1971).
(latest available data is for 1969.)
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their British counterparts, they obviously have more owners. In ad-
dition, the corporations listed on The London Stock Exchange tend
to be more closely held than American listed corporations. The New
York Stock Exchange requires that corporations have at least 2000
shareholders who hold no less than 100 shares each.4" The American
Stock Exchange requires listed corporations to have at least 1200
shareholders holding 100 shares or more.4" In contrast The (London)
Stock Exchange requires only that at least thirty-five percent of a
class of equity shares be in the hands of the public." Trading of
securities also is much more widespread in the United States than
in the United Kingdom. In addition to the over-the-counter market,
there are thirteen American stock exchanges while the United King-
dom has no over-the-counter market and only one stock exchange.
In the United States, securities salesmen and brokers actively solicit
investments by individuals, while in the United Kingdom this prac-
tice is not permitted. Investors in the United Kingdom tend to
purchase securities through their banks or from brokers and issuing
houses with whom they have relatively long standing relationships.
These differences in the economic environment suggest that
American investors and analysts would demand more financial data
than would be demanded in the United Kingdom. In the United
Kingdom, the banks and brokers with whom persons deal often have
either direct knowledge about the affairs of corporations.or direct
access to this information. Both American corporations and the
holders of their securities are too numerous and geographically
widespread to permit the type of informal transmission of reliable
information, by informed intermediaries, as exists in the United
Kingdom. Consequently, formal communication of informa-
tion-primarily including information about audits-via financial
statements is demanded more in the United States than in the
United Kingdom. Furthermore, as is argued above, explicitly stated
auditing and reporting standards are desired by investors and ana-
lysts in situations where they are not in direct contact with the
enterprise upon which the reports are made.
American investors also appear more concerned than British
investors with earnings as an indication of investment value. Earn-
ings per share have been commonly reported in the United States
for a long time, but only recently were calculated as a matter of
48. New York Stock Exchange Company Manual, at B-3 (as amended Sept. 30, 1971)
in 2 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 23,086, at 17,705.
49. American Stock Exchange Guide, § 10, 001, July 1972, in 2 CCH FED. SEC. L. REp.
23,025.081, at 17,058.
50. The Stock Exchange Rules, c.1, 16(b), at 6 (1974).
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course in the United Kingdom. The British attitude toward the
purpose of financial statements is well expressed in the ICAEW's
Counsel's memorandum in the Hedley Byrne" decision: " . . . the
object of annual accounts is to assist shareholders in exercising their
control of the company by enabling them to judge how its affairs
have been conducted. . . .The purpose for which annual ac-
counts are normally prepared is not to enable individual
shareholders to make investment decisions. 52 The American atti-
tude is expressed by the SEC, which asserts that the disclosure of
financial accounting data is required so that "investors may make
a realistic appraisal of the merits of securities and thus exercise an
informed judgment in determining whether to purchase them."' 3
This demand for corporate financial information has implica-
tions for the way information is produced. In the United States,
corporate management generally must provide financial statements
to a large number of shareholders and other intested parties if the
corporation wants widespread trading in its shares. These people
range widely in the degree of experience, financial expertise, and
technical ability with which they read the statements. The more
sophisticated readers might know that the statements can convey
little, if any, information that is sufficiently timely or meaningful
for them to use for portfolio investment decisions. Other readers,
however, might demand that management answer their many and
varied queries about the meaning of the numbers reported. Hence,
the company's resources might be husbanded by management were
they able to claim, to the satisfaction of shareholders, that the state-
ments were prepared in accordance with generally recognized ac-
counting principles, as promulgated by professional independent
public accountants.
This hypothesis is consistent with the data. In the 1920's, own-
ership and trading of shares by persons was much more widespread
in the United States than in the United Kingdom, possibly even
more so than it is in the United Kingdom today. 4 Perhaps as a
consequence, movement toward promulgation of explicit accounting
standards began much earlier here than in the United Kingdom.
The AICPA (then the American Institute of Accountants) endorsed
an influential memorandum, "Approved Methods for the Prepara-
51. Hedley Byrne & Co. v. Heller & Partners, Ltd., [1963] 2 All E. R. 575 (H.L.).
52. ICAEW, Accountants Liability to Third Parties-The Hedley Byrne Decision, at 2
(Aug. 1965).
53. SEC, THE WORK OF THE SECURTImS AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 1 (1967).
54. Reliable data on individual share ownership is not available; these statements are
based on the unanimous opinions of brokers in both countries whom I interviewed.
55. AICPA, Approved Methods for Preparation of Balance Sheet Statements (1917).
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tion of Balance Sheet Statements," in 1917.11 A revised statement
was formally adopted in 1929. In the late 1920's, the Institute en-
gaged in discussions and an exchange of letters with the New York
Stock Exchange that led to the formal adoption of six "rules or
principles" in 1934.56 The United States, of course, enacted much
more demanding securities legislation in the 1930's than exists
today in the United Kingdom.
The degree of disclosure of financial data also reflects the de-
mand for data by investors and the economies of supply by corpora-
tions. In 1926, all of the New York Stock Exchange listed corpora-
tions published balance sheets and net income, fifty-five percent
disclosed sales, forty-five percent disclosed cost of goods sold,
seventy-one percent disclosed depreciation and eighty-two percent
were audited by CPAs.5 7 By the year prior to the requirement of
disclosure by the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, the
percentage of corporations disclosing sales had risen to sixty-two,
fifty-four percent had disclosed cost of goods sold, and ninety-three
percent had disclosed depreciation. Ninety-four percent of the listed
corporations were audited by CPAs. Similar data are not available
for the United Kingdom during this period. In the year before the
Companies Act of 1967 required the disclosure of sales, however, as
much as thirty percent of U.K. listed companies did not report this
information. 8
Thus the data are consistent with the hypothesis that greater
demand for financial information by widely dispersed individuals
results in corporations supplying financial statements prepared in
accordance with explicit accounting standards in order that corpo-
rations can increase public confidence in their management and
thus increase the demand for their securities. As the United King-
dom has moved closer to the United States in more widespread
interest in shares by persons, their accounting standards also have
become more explicit.
3. The Regulatory Environment in the United States and the United
Kingdom
Differences in the regulatory environments in the United States
and the United Kingdom were considered earlier. In short, the SEC
is an active, rule-making agency that enforces its decrees while the
56. For a full discussion see ZEFF, supra note 8, at 110-268.
57. Benston, The Value of the SEC's Accounting Disclosure Requirements, 44 ACC'mo
REV. 515, 519 (1969).
58. See Benston, supra note 20, at 4-39.
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DTI is primarily a repository for financial statements filed in com-
pliance with the Companies Acts.
As the analysis previously presented indicates, an active regu-
latory agency has an incentive for insisting on conservative, explicit,
even rigid accounting standards. Such standards reduce the risk to
the agency that it will be criticized for "accepting" statements that,
when viewed with the benefit of hindsight, appear misleading or
fraudulent. Explicit standards and detailed rules also allow the
agency to process efficiently the statements filed with it. Therefore,
it is not surprising that the SEC tends to want uniform, conserva-
tive reporting by corporations. The Commission's staff must handle
a large number of prospectuses and periodic reports. Although it is
specifically not charged with approving or disapproving the state-
ments filed with it, it cannot and does not simply accept a state-
ment without examination. Instead, the SEC requires registrants to
disclose more data, eliminate disclosure of non-verifiable data, and
change the basis and form of accounts. Should the staff allow a
prospectus to become effective that later proves to be misleading,
the Commission may be severely criticized. One of the most notable
examples of this possibility is the Kaiser-Frazer case, 59 where an
underwriter refused to perform on its contract because it claimed
the registration statements, which became effective, were materi-
ally misleading." The courts upheld the underwriter in a suit by
Kaiser-Frazer, and a subsequent Congressional Committee issued
an investigation report that was sharply critical of the SEC. The
recently revealed instances of allegedly fraudulent periodic financial
statements filed by National Student Marketing,"1 Equity Fund-
ing,62 and Home Stake Production 3 may lead to additional, though
probably unwarranted, criticism of the Commission. 4
What, then, can the SEC do to protect itself from these criti-
cisms and from critics who charge that the staff gives inconsistent
59. Kaiser-Frazer Corp. v. Otis and Co., 195 F.2d 838 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 344 U.S.
856 (1952).
60. Id. at 840. See RAPPAPORT, supra note 3, at 13, 9-14 for a more complete description.
61. SEC v. Nat'l Student Marketing Corp., D.D.C. Civil Action No. 72-225; Feb. 3,
1972. Full Text of Complaint in [1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,360.
62. SEC v. Equity Funding Corp. of America [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC.
L. REP. 93,917 (Complaint by SEC and permanent injunction set forth in full). See also
United States v. Goldblum, [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,200 (C.D.
Cal. 1973) (Summary of 105-count indictment against 20 former employees of Equity Funding
and 2 of the firm's auditors).
63. Anderson v. Home-Stake Production Co. Complaint filed May 22, 1974, 1974 BNA
SEC. REG. & L. REP. No. 263, at A-13 (N.D. Okla.).
64. See, e.g., Sargent, The SEC and the Individual Investor: Restoring His Confidence
in the Market, 60 VA. L. Ray. 553 (1974).
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rulings to different registrants? An obvious solution is to insist that
registrants report verifiable, traditional, voluminous, uniform ac-
counting data. Requirements are imposed on all corporations even
though the "problem" they were designed to "solve" applied only
to a few corporations. For example, apparently as a consequence of
the Penn Central failure, all corporations are required to report their
compensating balance arrangements and other details related to
short term borrowing. Since this information may have been useful
to investors in this well publicized case, all corporations must incur
the expense of additional calculations and reporting. 5
The SEC also has not permitted appraisals of assets, particu-
larly mineral and oil deposits. It would be very difficult for the staff
to determine whether the appraisals were competent or dishonest.
It is both safer and administratively more efficient simply to forbid
appraisals, even when accompanied by explanations about the ap-
praisers and methods of appraisal and warnings about the probabil-
ity of error. These considerations also appear to have been impor-
tant determinants of the SEC's policy of not allowing other depar-
tures from the historical basis of recording assets.
In the United Kingdom, appraisals of assets are permitted, as
are forecasts. The DTI, which is not responsible, de jure or de facto,
for accounting standards, does not promulgate rules and regula-
tions. Consequently, the specific items required to be disclosed are
limited to those explicitly listed in the Companies Acts enacted by
Parliament.66 The reader also should recall that the Companies Acts
apply almost equally to all limited liability companies-of which
there are over 500,000. It probably is clear to the legislators and
government officials in the United Kingdom that imposition of de-
tailed reporting requirements on so many companies where the own-
ers are the managers, and hence, are directly aware of the economic
status of their enterprises, would impose costs that exceed the ex-
pected benefits. Thus differences in the regulatory environment in
the United States and the United Kingdom also "explain" differ-
ences in the explicitness of accounting standards. The more regula-
tion, the more explicit are accounting standards.
4. The Legal Environment in the United States and United
Kingdom
Common Law Differences.17 In both the United States and
65. SEC Accounting Series Release No. 148, CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 72, 170 (Nov.
13, 1973).
66. The requirements appear in scattered sections of the 1948 and 1967 Acts.
67. Actions for breach of contract and actual or constructive fraud are not discussed
because accountants in both countries are similarly liable.
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Great Britain some ten years ago, the primary benefit rule expressed
in Ultramares8 governed the liability of accountants to third parties
for negligence. 9 The court held that investors and other third par-
ties could not hold accountants liable for a negligent audit if the
report ". . . was primarily for the benefit of the [client] . . . for
use in the development of the business, and incidentally or collater-
ally for the use of those to whom [the client] and his associates
might exhibit it thereafter.""0 This rule was applied very narrowly,
so as to make the efforts of third-party plaintiffs generally unsuc-
cessful in providing that they were primary beneficiaries of a negli-
gent audit.
The first important change in the application of the primary
benefit rule occurred in the United Kingdom, as a consequence of
the Hedley Byrne decision.7' Though the House of Lords did not
discuss liability for annual accounts (the case involved an accomo-
dation credit report by a bank upon which a third party relied to
his damage), the decision makes it clear that an accountant who
makes a negligent, though honest, misrepresentation, may be liable
for financial damages caused to a person with whom no contract
exists.72 The Counsel to the ICAEW interprets the application of the
decision as follows:
In Counsel's view third parties entitled to recover damages under the
Hedley Byrne principle will be limited to those who by reason of accountants'
negligence in preparing reports, accounts or financial statements on which the
third parties place reliance suffer financial loss in circumstances where the
accountants knew or ought to have known that the reports, accounts or finan-
cial statements in question were being prepared for the specific purpose or
transaction which gave rise to the loss and that they would be shown to and
relied on by third parties in that particular connection. There is no general
principle that accountants may be liable for damages if a report or statement
which proves to have been prepared negligently by them is shown casually or
in the course of business to third parties who suffer loss through reliance on
the report or statement.7'3
With respect to the accountant's liability to shareholders, they
state:
... a decision by the shareholders collectively taken on the basis of negli-
gently prepared accounts and resulting in improper payments by or financial
68. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
69. Id. See Gormley, Accountants' Professional Liability-A Ten-Year Review, 29 Bus.
LAW. 1205 (1974); Hill, The Liabilities of International Practice in NEGLIGENCE AND THE PUBLIC
AccouNTAr 3 (1972).
70. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. at 183, 174 N.E. at 446 (1931).
71. Hedley Byrne & Co. v. Heller & Partners, Ltd., [1963] All E.R. 575 (H.L.).
72. Id.
73. Accountants Liability to Third Parties-The Hedley Byrne Decision, supra note 52,
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loss to the company could result in liability. No claim by an individual share-
holder, however, would succeed in respect of loss suffered through his own
investment decisions made on the strength of misleading company accounts
supported by an auditors' report containing negligent misrepresentations
74
This interpretation, however, is not unanimous in the United King-
dom. In particular, Mary Arden argues:
...it would be extremely difficult for an auditor to argue that he undertook
no duty of care to shareholders in respect of loss suffered as a result of individ-
ual investment decisions taken on the basis of negligently prepared accounts.
It is true that he had no particular shareholder, or transaction by a share-
holder, in mind when reporting on the accounts. But he undertook a duty of
care to the shareholders as a body and must have known that the accounts
could be used by shareholders for their personal purposes. In other words it is
very possible, although the matter is not free from doubt, that an auditor owes
a duty of care to individual shareholders under Hedley Byrne when reporting
on the annual accounts.7 5
The accountant's liability with respect to prospectuses, how-
ever, does not appear in doubt. The Institute's Counsel states:
But if the audited accounts comprised in effect part of a document of offer,
and the auditors knew or ought to have known that the accounts were intended
to be so used, they could be liable to third parties for financial loss suffered
through reliance on a negligent auditor's report in connection with the offer.7'
American law is also being extended to include liability of ac-
countants to third parties. From his survey, R. James Gormley con-
cludes that "[tihe trend suggests the likelihood either that the
primary benefit rule is broadening to coincide with the foreseen
person concept of the Second Restatement [American Law Insti-
tute, Second Restatement of the Law of Torts, 1965], or that the
foreseen person concept is absorbing and superceding the primary
benefit rule."77
Thus, American and British common law now is interpreted as
possibly, perhaps probably, supporting damage suits against negli-
gent accountants by shareholders, investors, and other third parties
who use published financial statements for investment decisions.
There seems little doubt that accountants who certify financial
statements for inclusion into prospectuses used to sell shares are
liable for negligence to investors. Before considering the effect of
these potential liabilities on the ^contents of financial statements,
74. Id.
75. Arden, A Legal View of Current U.K. Practice, in NEGUGENc E AND THE PUBUC
ACCOUNTANT 24, 26 (1972).
76. Accountants Liability to Third Parties-The Hedley Byrne Decision, supra note 52,
at 2.
77. See Gormley, supra note 70, at 1211 (discussing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
531 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964)).
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accountants' liability under the securities laws of the two countries
is outlined.
Securities Law Differences. Unlike the common-law similari-
ties, considerable differences exist between the statutory treatment
of accountants' liability in the two countries. The British statutes
add very little to the common law. The 1948 Companies Act prohib-
its companies only from indemnifying their auditors from liability
as a consequence of any negligence, default, breach of duty or
breach of trust.78
In the United States the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934 made significant alterations in the com-
mon law. As interpreted in the BarChris case,79 Section 11 of the '33
Act" does away with the requirement of privity of contract between
the auditor and the investor as a condition of recovery by the inves-
tor. The auditor who has examined and reported upon the financial
statements contained in a securities registration (and has consented
to their use therein) is also deprived of his most important common-
law protection in suits by third parties. All an investor need do to
maintain a suit against the auditor is prove that the statements
contained a material omission or misstatement. In his defense, the
auditor must prove "due diligence"-that is, that after reasonable
investigation he had reasonable grounds to believe, and did believe
at the time the registration statement became effective, that the
financial statements were true.8 1 It should be emphasized that the
auditor's responsibility continues to the time the statements be-
come effective (accepted by the SEC) even though this is after
completion of the audit and preparation of the report.
Section 11 of the '33 Act applies only to purchases of securities
in offerings. Section 10(b) of the '34 Act" and SEC Rule 10b-58 3
extend to periodic statements the auditor's liability for making any
untrue statement or omission of a material fact. Though the rule
was adopted originally to prohibit "any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance . . .in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security"84 it has been interpreted by the court to apply to
auditors. As Gormley concludes:
[Aluditors whose opinions are used in connection with a sale or purchase of
securities are exposed to potential liability in private suits under rule 10b-5
78. Companies Act 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c.38, § 205 (1972).
79. Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
80. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970).
81. 283 F. Supp. at 697.
82. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970).
83. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1974).
84. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970).
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even though they did none of the purchasing or selling and realized no profit
in any securities transaction. 5
He also observes:
Since 1968 [Texas Gulf Sulphur] the term "in connection with" has been
construed broadly enough so that audit opinions and audited or unaudited
financial statements with which auditors became associated may, along with
other corporate statements and information, be statements "in connection
with" purchase and sales of the corporation's securities by investors, even
though . . . not in a prospectus or in a purchase or sale of the corporation's
securities."
He concludes, however, that
it is reasonable to require a plaintiff in a rule 10b-5 suit against independent
accountants to prove more than ordinary negligence in connection with...
financial statements, audited or unaudited."7
Thus the American accountant is somewhat more vulnerable to
suits claiming misrepresentation and negligence in the preparation
of periodic statements than is his British counterpart, and he is
considerably more vulnerable than a British accountant with re-
spect to financial statements included in prospectuses registered
with the regulatory agency. The most important difference in the
two countries' legal environments, however, is the likelihood that
aggrieved third parties will sue accountants.
Differences in the Ability and Propensity of Third Parties to
Sue Accountants. It is much easier and more profitable for investors
and other third parties to sue accountants for damages in the United
States than in the United Kingdom. In the United States a deriva-
tive action suit may be filed by aggrieved minority shareholders
against the officers and directors. Should the shareholders win, the
amounts recovered are paid by the defendants to the corporation,
and the plaintiffs and their attorney may be awarded legal costs and
attorney's fees (the latter being an important motivation for such
suits). In the United Kingdom a similar action can be taken under
the "fraud on a minority" exception to the rule in Foss v.
Harbottle,8 but this exception has been applied very restrictively.
Hence the Jenkins Committee in 1962 recommended that the Com-
panies Act should give the court express power "to authorize pro-
ceedings to be brought against a third party in the name of the
company by such a person or persons and on such terms as the Court
85. Gormley, supra note 70, at 1220.
86. Id. at 1221.
87. Id. at 1222.
88. Foss v. Harbottle, 2 Hare 461, 67 Eng. Rep. 189 (V. Ch. 1843). For a fuller discus-
sion, see Boyle, The Derivative Action in Company Law, 1969 J. Bus. L. 120.
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may direct."89 This change, however, has not yet been enacted. In
addition, the Companies Act of 1948 does not support a suit against
an issuer of securities for a false prospectus as does the Securities
Act of 1933.90 Furthermore, while there is reason to believe that the
United Kingdom Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act of 195811
would support a suit similar to the Rule 10b-5 actions in the United
States, there have been very few such suits.
In the United States, the shareholder's ability to succeed in a
derivative suit is limited by a number of technical requirements,
including a subtle-and some claim an often almost unworka-
ble-requirement of proof that the injury be to the corporate entity
itself rather than to the individual shareholders in their individual
capacities.2 If the latter is found to have been the case, a derivative
action will not be allowed. Although this inability to demonstrate
the validity of a derivative action suit is not unusual, American
investors still have tremendous procedural advantages over their
British counterparts by virtue of the class action suit under Rule 23
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 3 Even though the scope of
these suits has been reduced and the costs of maintaining them
increased by some recent Supreme Court decisions, 4 they can still
be a potent weapon.
Though the shareholders' derivative suit and the class action
have a number of technical and often strategically important differ-
ences between them, the similarities are much more significant. In
each case the purpose of the procedure is to allow a large number
of persons with possibly small injuries to be compensated in one
action. Without the availability of these procedures, no single injury
might promise sufficient recovery to warrant bringing the suit. By
aggregating a large number of similarly situated parties in one ac-
tion, however, the total amount recovered is often quite substantial.
Even so, the pro rata recovery to any member of the group may often
be very small, and the problem remains of motivating someone to
initiate such action. Here one of the most striking differences be-
89. See Report, supra note 35, 206, at 76.
90. Compare Companies Act 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c.38 (1972), with Securities Act of
1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77(l)(2) (1970).
91. Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act of 1958, 6 & 7 Eliz. 2, c.45 (1972).
92. See, e.g., 13 Fletcher Cyc. Corp. (Perm. Ed.) 5947 (1969).
93. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.
94. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974) (holding plaintiff must bear
the cost of providing individual notice to identifiable class members and notice requirements
may not be waived or tailored to plaintiff's financial condition, even when an extremely large
class would be included in the action); Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973)
(holding even unnamed plaintiffs in diversity class actions must meet the jurisdictional
amount requirement).
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tween American and British legal practices prevails. In the United
States shareholders' derivative action, if the shareholders are suc-
cessful, the court will award a substantial legal fee to the successful
attorney, and in the class actions, the initiating member of the class
may arrange, with the approval of the court, for the attorney to
recover a contingent fee.
Even if a class action is allowed in the United Kingdom, the
practice of "taxing" unsuccessful litigants for costs and not allowing
contingent legal fees is a powerful disincentive to law suits. Thus,
while it is very common in the United States, it is rare for British
shareholders to sue corporate directors, officers and accountants. In
fact, since the courts have held that violations of most federal secur-
ities laws are admissable as bases for private civil actions, a signifi-
cant part of the total enforcement of these laws results from private
actions rather than from those initiated by the SEC. The Commis-
sion has on occasion specifically mentioned the use of private ac-
tions as the preferable mode of enforcement.
Administrative Legal Action. The Department of Trade and
Industry, which administers the United Kingdom Companies Acts,
is not at all the English equivalent of the SEC. Unlike the SEC, the
DTI does not actually administer the securities laws; nor does it
review the financial statements filed with them, investigate "suspi-
cious" situations in the absence of a formal complaint, chastise,
suspend or otherwise discipline auditors and others who practice
before it. As evidence of the DTI's hesitance to undertake legal
actions, it should be noted that in 1971 inspectors were appointed
for twenty-four companies (ten of whom were previously ap-
pointed), and that charges were filed in 517 cases for failure to
forward annual returns, fifteen cases of failure to keep proper books
and thirteen cases of fraudulent trading." The SEC, on the other
hand, actively administers the federal securities laws and its princi-
pal impact is on the contents of and standards underlying financial
reports. The SEC enforcement procedure utilizes such administra-
tive actions as threats of investigation, publicity, stop-orders, in-
junctions, and suspensions from practice before it, as well as recom-
mendations to the Justice Department for criminal prosecutions. In
1972, for example, twenty-seven administrative proceedings related
to disclosure cases were instituted, 145 injunctions were ordered
with 654 defendants enjoined and forty-nine cases were referred to
the Justice Department for a variety of causes."
95. 1971 Department of Trade and Industry Annual Report.
96. 39 SEC ANN. REP. 170 (1973).
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For auditors, however, the SEC's greatest power lies in the
unfavorable publicity it can bring to bear on a CPA it feels has
"misbehaved." One of the CPA's most valuable assets is the pub-
lic's belief in his integrity, honesty and expertise. By suspending a
CPA from practice, even for a few days or a week, the SEC can
seriously damage his reputation. The mere public announcement of
the investigation of a CPA can be a substantial punishment. An-
other modified weapon relied upon by the SEC is a time consuming
review of registration statements filed by a CPA's clients. Further
escalation might include a review of a CPA firm's audit procedures,
as was agreed to recently by two large firms,' 7 and civil and criminal
charges against individual CPA's. While the latter procedures are
rare, the cost to accountants should they even be threatened would
be considerable.
Consequence of Differences in the Legal Environment. Al-
though the two systems are very similar with respect to the
common-law liability of accountants for fraud and negligence, the
provisions of the United States Securities Acts and the ability and
incentives of third parties to sue accountants are in sharp contrast
to the lack of similar statutory provisions and third party incentives
in the United Kingdom. Since the legal and quasi-legal actions that
can be brought by the SEC are peculiar to the United States, Ameri-
can accountants are more likely to have to defend their audits and
opinions before a court or regulator than are their British counter-
parts. While careful documentation of audits and a healthy skepti-
cism about a client's enthusiasm are generally approved defenses,
they may not be sufficient. What may seem to be an adequate audit
procedure or a reasonable reporting decision, beforehand, may seem
inept or deliberately misleading after the fact. What may be under-
stood as competent professional performance and judgment for a
given set of circumstances to a fellow professional may not be so
understood by a jury, judge or even a regulator who must explain
his action to legislators, the press or the general public. Therefore,
accountants understandably attempt to rely on explicitly stated
generally accepted auditing and reporting practice as a necessary
means of defense against lawsuits and punitive regulatory actions.
Explicitly stated standards allow CPA's to document that their ac-
tions were taken in accordance with recognized professional pre-
scriptions. 8
97. See In re Touche Ross & Co., SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-5459, Admin. Prac.
File No. 3-4437 (Feb. 25, 1974).
98. But see United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
1006 (1970). The Court ruled that fulfillment of recognized professional standards is not a
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CPA's who fear lawsuits also can protect themselves by insist-
ing that clients follow conservative accounting practices that tend
to understate rather than overstate net income and equity. Two
particular reasons in support of this practice deserve mention. First,
the more stringent '33 Act provisions (Section 11) apply only to
offerings of securities. While pre-offering (current) shareholders
may lose if shares are sold for less than they would have brought had
favorable financial statement data not been understated, relief gen-
erally is limited to purchasers." Therefore conservatively stated re-
ports in prospectuses are preferable to "correctly" stated reports.
Secondly, investors are more likely to sue should prices decrease
more than expected than if prices increase more than expected.' ®
In an attempt to recover their losses from accountants, disgruntled
investors may seize upon an ex post appearance of overstated earn-
ings or equity as a basis for suit.
Accountants also can protect themselves from lawsuits by re-
fusing to be associated with estimates that can later be shown to be
incorrect. This tactic is frequently used with estimates where a fu-
ture event will reveal the actual figure. For example, an accountant
might estimate the market valie of land, taking into account the
range of possible sales prices and the probabilities that each might
occur, from which an expected value is calculated. While this is the
"best" procedure from which an estimate can be constructed before
the fact, nevertheless it may turn out to be wrong. Either some other
sales amount than the one with the greatest probability or expected
value may be received or else conditions may. change to invalidate
the original estimate. Given that the estimate was demonstrably
incorrect, it may be difficult to prove that it was honestly and com-
petently made. Here, accountants can protect themselves by insist-
ing that assets be recorded at historical cost, which is an objectively
determined, verifiable datum, and by explicitly disassociating
themselves from forecasts.
complete defense in a criminal case. While this reduces the value of more explicit standards,
the Court indicated that a standard specifically aimed at the situation at issue in a case will
have added evidentiary weight. Id. at 806. This pushes in the direction of more explicit and
detailed standards.
99. The court's ruling in United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 1006 (1970), that fulfillment of recognized professional standards may not
be a complete defense in a criminal case, somewhat reduces the value of explicit standards.
The Court did indicate, however, that a standard specifically aimed at the situation at issue
will have added evidentiary weight.
100. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, § 12(1), 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1970).
[Vol. 28
COMPARISON OF STANDARDS
4. Summary of Environmental Differences
As the prior discussion indicates, United States and United
Kingdom accounting practices are what one would predict from the
professional, economic, regulatory and legal environments of these
countries. The professional environment in the United Kingdom
permits a greater degree of peer pressure on accountants than can
be achieved in the United States and consequently the need for
codified, explicit accounting standards to maintain the public
image of accountants is greater in the United States. The economic
differences between the two systems center around the greater own-
ership and trading of shares by American investors which makes it
efficient for American corporations to compile financial statements
prepared in accordance with auditing and reporting standards that
even unsophisticated individuals can recognize or accept. The exist-
ence of the SEC is another distinguishing feature between the
United States and the United Kingdom. Since regulators find that
codified, explicit standards allow more efficient administration of
the statutes and a protection against adverse criticism should a
corporation whose statements they "accept" "go wrong," it is not
surprising that the SEC has been a force towards more explicit
United States accounting standards. In the legal arena, American
accountants are more vulnerable to lawsuits than are their British
counterparts and are naturally more desirous of codified standards
that can be used both as guidelines and also as justifications for
actions that in retrospect may seem deliberately misleading.
III. CONSEQUENCES OF ExPLIcrr vs. IMPLIcIT ACCOUNTING STANDARDS
FOR INVESTORS
Having explored the positive question, "why are accounting
standards stated explicitly or implicitly?", I now address the nor-
mative question, "which practice is better for the investor?" "The
investor" refers to present and potential shareholders as a group,
where an individual has an equal probability of being an owner,
seller, or purchaser of shares. "Better" refers to the expected money
value of the investor's wealth, net of expected costs (reductions in
wealth), given a specified degree of risk. Thus, if the adoption of
formal accounting standards tends to increase the wealth embodied
in corporate shares, this practice is considered better for investors.
A first observation is that the more explicit the auditing stan-
dards the less auditors will use their individual professional
judgment to determine the scope of audits. Additionally, users of
financial statements will have more reason to believe that specific
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audit procedures were followed even when they do not know and
cannot question the auditors. Thus, the cost of using financial state-
ments should be lower. The cost to corporations of audits, however,
would tend to be higher, since auditors must follow the stated mini-
mum standards even in situations where they believe them unneces-
sary. For example, in the United States inventories must be physi-
cally verified and receivables must be confirmed where either of
these assets represents a significant proportion of the current assets
or the total assets of a company. British auditors need not follow
these procedures (though they generally do) if they believe them
unnecessary for the statements to be "true and fair." Thus there is
a trade-off: somewhat greater reliability and lower cost of using
financial statements versus somewhat higher audit fees.
A second observation is that more explicit reporting standards
result in more objectively determined but at the same time less
potentially meaningful financial information. If the scope for man-
agements' and accountants' judgments about interpretations of the
economic status, past and future, of a company is narrowed suffi-
ciently by explicit standards, some potentially useful subjective es-
timates cannot be communicated. For example, although the
amount and market value of mineral deposits may only be ap-
praised imperfectly, the estimate can be more useful to investors
than knowledge of the original cost of the resource. Similarly, while
forecasts of sales may prove wrong, investors may still find manage-
ment's forecast very useful. However, if the appraisal and forecast
were intended to mislead investors, they would have been in a better
position had publication of these estimates been prohibited.
A related observation is that more explicit reporting standards
allow less scope for both managements' and accountants' judg-
ments. Explicit reporting standards may permit management to
choose among a few generally accepted procedures that reflect most
situations accurately. However, management still may deliberately
choose a method that, in a particular circumstance, misleadingly
reports events. Accountants, then, may find it difficult to object to
managements' choice of a "generally accepted accounting proce-
dure." Should only a single procedure be deemed acceptable, it may
inadvertently lead to misleading reporting where it is inappro-
priate.'0 ' Where accountants are charged only with giving an opinion
as to whether the financial statements present a "true and fair
view" of the company's economic situation, they need only answer
101. A number of empirical studies, however, reject the assumption that reported ac-
counting data affect share prices. For a review of the evidence, see Benston, supra note 20,
ch. 4, § 4.2.6.
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whether, in their judgment, a particular procedure meets this crite-
rion. In this situation, however, users of financial statements must
rely on the accountants' judgment and integrity. Lack of flexibility,
then, reduces opportunities for deliberate manipulation but also
increases the likelihood of inadvertent misstatements. Which alter-
native is "better" for shareholders depends on one's estimate of the
ability and integrity of accountants.
Finally, explicit accounting standards require a formal means
of establishing, changing and policing the standards. An FASB in
the United States or ASSC in the United Kingdom is required to
do research in support of proposed standards. The standards
adopted must then be promulgated and enforced,"0 2 which is a more
expensive process than the informal acceptance of implicitly under-
stood professional standards. The process of stating standards ex-
plicitly, however, may also bring increased knowledge and under-
standing that improves the usefulness of the data reported to inves-
tors.
In summary, the existence of benefits to investors of more or
less explicit accounting standards depends on answers to the follow-
ing questions:
1. Are the additional costs of auditing less than the ex-
pected additional value of the reliability of the data presented in
financial statements?
2. Is the reduced potential for manipulation greater or less
when there is more than one acceptable accounting standard for
a given situation or when accountants are charged simply with
certifying that the statements are "not misleading" or present a
"true and fair view?"
3. Where the choice of alternative accounting procedures is
severely limited, does the value of reducing the potential for ma-
nipulation exceed the cost of misinforming in situations where the
prescribed procedure is inappropriate?
4. Does the prohibition of subjective and potentially inac-
curate estimates reduce the expected loss to investors of deliber-
ate misrepresentation more than it reduces the expected value to
them of obtaining the estimates?
5. Is the cost of establishing and policing explicit standards
less than the benefits to shareholders?
The experience of the United States and the United Kingdom
provides some insight but no definitive answers to these questions.
102. See generally Moonitz, supra note 2.
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The United States has experienced a number of serious frauds and
business failures that were directly traceable to misleading financial
statements and accountants have been charged with everything
from negligence and neglect of duty to criminal fraud. Financial
writers and academics have accused the profession of perpetrating
frauds upon the public by allowing and even counselling clients to
use generally accepted, though misleading, accounting procedures.
In contrast, the United Kingdom has experienced no criminal trials,
few civil suits and very few charges of unprofessional acts against
accountants. One should not necessarily conclude from this experi-
ence, however, that explicit standards are less useful to investors
than are implicit standards or that formal disciplinary procedures
are less effective than informal peer pressure. As previously dis-
cussed, the many differences between the two systems preclude
such broad generalizations.
Some conclusions, however, can be drawn. It seems clear that
the gross costs to investors are greater for maintaining a system of
explicit accounting standards than for maintaining a system of im-
plicit standards. Among such costs are higher audit fees, FASB
funding, SEC expenses, lawyers' fees and numerous other costs.
What then are the benefits from the additional auditing and disclo-
sure required? The available evidence on the relationship between
published corporate financial statements and stock prices indicates
that, when published, accounting data have either little information
content or that the information they convey was learned from other
sources before the statements were published."' Considering the
conceptual problems inherent in measuring economic events, it is
questionable whether financial statements can convey much infor-
mation other than that the company's records were audited by inde-
pendent, certified accountants who found no gross improprieties. '
In this event, it would seem that explicit reporting standards may
result in costs that exceed benefits to investors. Explicit auditing
standards, however, may well be worth their cost where peer pres-
sure and lack of knowledge about the qualifications of accountants
make this a more efficient means of ensuring a standard of perform-
ance.
103. See Benston, supra note 20, ch. 4, § 4.2.6.
104. See Benston, The Extent of Financial Reporting by Publicly Owned Companies:
A Professional Behavior Hypothesis, FINAN. ExEc. (Dec. 1975).
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